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No.: 35119 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
And 
SPECTRA SITE, LLC, 
;I 
.., 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE , 
FIRST JUDICAL DISTRICT . '. : '1 
, .;.\ 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO . . ,  . . :, y', 
, ,... " 
Dl AND FOR THE STATE ... , ..,..  
' ' t  
OF IDAHO 13 
vs.  
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Real Party In Interest - Respondent, 
Defendants-Appellants. I 
CV 2003 462 1 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County 
Honorable John T. Mitchell, presiding 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
Douglas P. Lawrence & 
Brenda J. Lawrence 
4925 N. Webster Street 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83815 
Tel.: (208) 704-0644 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Cases and Authorities .................................................................................................... 2 
Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief ....................................................................................... 3 
1 . Table Summarizing Rebuttal Evidence ................................................................. 8 
. . 2 . Table Summanzing Wrong Facts .......................................................................... 13 
3 . Genuine Issues of Material Fact ........................................................................... 18 
4 . Disqualification .................................................................................................... 18 
5 . Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 21 
Certificate of Service .................................................................................................................... 22 
Table of Cases and Authorities 
G & M Fanns. 119 Idaho at 517. 808 P.2d at 854 ........................................................................... 3 
Sanders v . Kuna Joint School Dist.. 125 Idaho 872. 874. 876 P.2d 154. 156 (Ct . App . 1994) ....... 3 
Tower Asset Sub. Inc . v Lawrence. 143 Idaho 710. 152 p . 3d 581 (2007) .................................. 6. 7 
I.A.R. 34(0(1) Augmentation of Briefs .......................................................................................... 5 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Spectra Site notes that the Lawrences' brief contains cites to the Capstar record and 
argues that those facts and cites are simply irrelevant to this case. Spectra Site does not specify 
which facts and cites are irrelevant, nor do they cite any law to support their argument. Rather, 
they claim that this Court should only consider on appeal, those contained in the clerk's record 
for this case. 
However, the trial court noted in it's decision regarding Tower Asset theories, 
"Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstark easement by implication from prior use, 
easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the Halls." [R Vol3 p. 652 L. 
12-13] Spectra Site also recognizes on page 12 of the Respondent's Brief, that the trial court 
incorporated its previous analysis of the three easement theories from Capstar, and concluded 
that Hall had the same easement rights. 
In making its findings of fact and determinations in Tower, the trial court obviously 
considered the Capstar record as being relevant. Since the trial court included the Capstar record 
in its decision regarding Tower, the cites to the Capstar record is completely relevant to this case. 
When a court considers a motion for summary judgment in a case that would be 
tried to a jury, all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable inferences 
must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms, 119 Idaho 
at 517,808 P.2d at 854; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874, 
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994) 
This case has been in litigation since June 2003. At no time prior to the present has 
Tower taken any action to separate its proceedings from that of Capstar. To the contrary, Tower 
hired the same local consul, generally filed similar briefs on the same day, scheduled hearings 
for the same day, and made the same arguments and referenced the same evidence in both 
matters. 
In particular, the deposition of Harold Funk was taken and transcribed for both cases. Mr. 
Whelan began his examination by saying: 
Good morning Mr. Funk. As I told yon when we arrived here today, my name is 
John Whelan. I'm a lawyer in Coenr d'Alene, and I represent Dong and Brenda 
Lawrence in a lawsuit filed by a company by the name of Capstar and a company 
by the name of Tower Asset Sub. There's actually two lawsuits pending. And, for 
the uumose of this, we're essentiallv taking one deposition for both lawsuits. 
[Funk Deposition 4:9-4: 181 
One FUNK deposition was taken for both lawsuits. Mr. Craig Vernon represented both 
Capstar and Tower Asset at the Funk Deposition and made no objection to the taking of one 
deposition for both lawsuits. Therefore, any cite to the Funk Deposition, would be applicable to 
either case. Spectra Site has not presented any argument to the contrary. 
Spectra Site also argues that failure to cite authorities and statues in the initial brief, with 
reference to the issues presented on appeal, are deemed waived and cite I.A.R. 35 (a)(6) as the 
controlling authority. 
While I.A.R. 35 does specify the content and arrangement of briefs, it does not state that 
the failure to cite authorities and statues to issues presented on appeal are deemed waived. 
Furthermore, Spectra Site's argument with regards to the initial brief, seems to go against I.A.R. 
34(f)(l) Augmentation of Briefs. 
At any time before the issuance of an opinion, any party may supplement his brief 
by the citation of additional authority, identifying the issue on.appeal to which it 
pertains, without written comment thereon, and identifying the headnote or 
relevant pages of the authority cited. This augmentation may be done by ,written 
notice to the court and aU parties without first obtaining leave of the court. 
Spectra Site further argues on page 12 of their Response Brief, that the trial court did not 
rule that the footnote comment by the Supreme Court relieved Spectra Site of proving that its 
landlord Hall, had an easement right which it could claim the benefit. That the trial court merely 
reviewed the chain of title and evaluated the intent expressed in the sales agreement to conclude 
that the Halls had easement rights across the Lawrence parcel. Spectra Site's analysis is not only 
difficult to understand, it is disingenuous and contrary to the record in this case. The issue(s) 
Tower placed before the court in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment, are not the same issue(s) Tower placed before the trial court at the hearing on their 
motion for Summary Judgment. Contrary still, is the argument Spectra Site now offers in its 
Respondents Brief. 
At hearing, Spectra Site argued that this Court was of the opinion that the Hall's benefited 
from an easement across the Lawrence parcel. And, the reason this Court remanded it back to the 
lower court for further proceeding was to determine if Tower, as a lessee of the Halls, benefited 
from the Hall's easement. 
MS WEEKS: . . . They noted in a footnote that there's not a dispute that Hall has a 
right to use the road, and I believe they did that based on augmentation of the 
record they requested at the Supreme Court level from another case that has not 
been augmented to this court, but they put that right in the opinion that Hall has 
the right to use the road. What they do say is that we can't quiet title of conrse in 
Tower Asset, now SpectraSite. They remand it and say what this court is to look at 
is with Hall having a right to use the road, what are the rights of - I'm going to 
keep slipping and calling it Tower, Your Honor, because I've called it Tower for 
so long, but I mean the new - 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MS. WEEKS: -the new SpectraSite. What rights did the new SpectraSite have to 
use the road? Your Honor, I've given yon the Am. Jnr. which is the case law out 
there. There is no case law that I have found that says otherwise which says a 
tenant has the same right to use the road as his landlord. Since the Supreme Court 
says that Mr. Hall has the right to use the road, Mr. Hall says that Tower is their 
tenant. Nothings been presented to say Tower is limited on using the road by Mr. 
Hall. Therefore, as a tenant they have a right to continue to use the road, and that 
was what was remanded to this court to inquire into, Your Honor . . . [TR p. 181 L. 
3-p. 182L.51 
The trial court reiterated this as being the controlling issue in its Memorandum Decision and 
Order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already 
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right 
to use the easement. The Idaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: "Tower 
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the 
benefit of the access road across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Asset Sub., Inc. v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. [R Vol. 3 p. 649 4[ 21 
Tower Asset correctly argues "the only issue remanded by the appellate court in 
this case was whether Tower Asset, as a tenant, has a legal right to benefit from 
the Blossom Mountain Road easement of its landlord, Halls." [R Vol. 3 p. 650 L. 
12-15] 
At no time prior to Tower's Motion for Summary Judgment did Tower ever state that the 
trial court was to perform an inquiry into Hall's rights to use the road. Hall was never a party to 
this action and Tower's motion for summary judgment was not out to determine Hall's rights, 
only Tower's. The inquiry into Hall's rights, simply, were never put before the trial court. 
Spectra Site then asserts on page 14: 
Lawrence argues that this Court's previous decision stands for the ~ ro~os i t ion  that 
Spectra Site was precluded from arguing that their land was burdened by servitude 
under any easement theory absent a prior quiet title action by Hall establishing 
these rights. Lawrence cites no legal authority for this argument on appeal. 
This Court has established that title ownership is a prerequisite to quiet title to an 
easement appurtenant in favor of a dominant estate ... As a result, Tower lacks standing to seek a 
quiet title in its favor. However, since standing to enforce the right to use an easement is 
consistent with the right to benefit from the easement, Tower will have standing to seek 
injunctive relief if it can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit from the Blossom 
Mountain Road easement. Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 p. 3d 581 
(2007). 
Whatever rights Tower claims the Halls have to the Lawrence parcel, would necessarily 
have to he perfected prior to any enforcement of said rights. That is the applicable law in this 
case and the legal authority the Lawrences cite for this argument. 
Spectra Site then argues, that the Lawrences' claim the trial court summarily dismissed 
their evidence and completely ignored contradictory evidence, was only supported by several 
facts the trial court got wrong. This is not the argument the Lawrences are making. Rather, the 
Lawrences are making two arguments. One, that the trial court summarily dismissed the 
contradictory evidence submitted by the Lawrences. Two, in addition to dismissing the 
Lawrence's rebuttal evidence, the trial court also just got several of its facts wrong. 
Listed on the following pages are two tables. The first is a table summarizing the rebuttal 
evidence and the facts the evidence establish. The second table identifies the facts the trial court 
just got wrong. 
Location 
Week's 
Affidavit 
Description of evidence 
junk Real Estate Contract 
~ebosition together with Funk I / 2. Contiguous parcels - no separation 
Fact(s) testify to: 
Funk's land purchase included: 
Parcel A: Government Lot 3 Section 15 
Parcel B: Southeast Quarter of Section 21 
Parcel C: Government Lot 4 
Southwest Quarter of Section 22 
Funk 
/deposition Exhibit 4 13. Places Government Lot 3 in Southwest 
FD 23:18 - 24:4 
Deposition together with Funk / 21, through Section 22 and into Section 15 
(excepting 1 acre) 
1. Funk estate 
Funk 
/deposition Exhibit 2 / 2. Funk was familiar with road 
Lawrence 
Affidavit 
R Vol2 p. 
283-285 
FD 58:l-58:17 
Quarter of Section 15 
1. Existence of road that extends from Section 
Copy of 1987 district court 
judgment in 
case no. 65077 
Affidavit 
R Vol2 p. 
286-302 
3. Funk identifies the road as a logging road 
Mellick Road as described in the Survey of 
Mellick road by Col. W. H. Edelblute, August 
1907, and change in Mellick, survey by W. H. 
Edelblute, April 1910 is declared to have been 
Lawrence 
1 I certaintv. that it was the same road. 
Copy of defendants motion 
for sanctions in case no. 
65077, April 23,1987 
at all times a public road in general. 
1. Defendants hired James P. Meckel, a 
professional engineer, to determine if Mellick 
road is the same Mellick road that County 
Commissioners dedicated in 191 0. 
2. Based on affidavit of Jame P. Meckel, he 
opinioned with reasonable engineering 
Item 
6 
Affidavit 
R Vo12 p. 
Location 
Lawrence 
7 
& survey of Mellick by W. 
H. Edelblnte 
Affidavit 
R Vol2 p. 
/ 1 Deposition / / 2. Establishes road existed at time of purchase 
Description of evidence 
Copy of 1907 viewers report 
the Southwest Quarter of Section 15 
298 
Lawrence 
8 
I I I 13. Establishes that Funk didn't care to use the 
Fact(& testify to: 
1. Establishes that Mellick road extends into 
County Surveyor for 
Kootenai County 
road because it had become overgrown 
9 1 Funk /FD 59:3-59:20 1 Road exists in Government Lot 3 
Affidavit of Bruce Anderson, 
to their lands via Mellick Road 
280-282 
Funk 
1 1 Deposition 1 together with Funk ! 
1. Opinioned that the Funks had a legal access 
1 1 /de~osition Exhibit 2 1 
FD 15:6-16:9 1. Establishes logging road 
I I I 12. His property completely surrounds the Hall 
10 
parcel. 
3. When he purchased his property in 1992, 
R Vol. 1 
p.52 
/ 1 Deposition / /extending into the Southeast Quarter of 11 
U Section 21 
Affidavit of John Mack 1. Purchased Funks remaining interest in land 
in Southwest Quarter of Section 22 
Funk FD 63:2-63: 15 
there where two roads entering his property. 
4. Another road via Mellick enters his 
property. 
Funk establishes the logging road as 
Location 
Funk 
Depositior 
Funk 
Depositio~ 
Funk 
Depositior 
R. Vo12 p 
397 9 5 
R. Vol. 3 
p. 515 qI 1: 
R. Vol. 3 
p. 517 
Funk 
Funk 
Depositior 
Funk 
Depositior 
together with Funk / 21 only 
Description of evidence 
FD 56%-57:5 
Fact@) testify to: 
1. Funk use of road to SW Quarter of Section 
deposition exhibit 2 
FD 55:4-55:5 
September 10,2007 affidavit / Search of public records reveal the the Funks 
2. Funk not crossing Section 28 
Funk didn't own land in Section 28 
FD 53:25-54:18 1. Funk never sought easement in Section 28 
2. Anticipated putting in another access road 
Affidavit of Douglas / i s  granted an easement across Section 28. 
of Douglas Lawrence 
November 13,2007 
Lawrence together with 12. If Funk had a legal access across Section 
never had an easement across Section 28 
1. In 1977, Lawrence's predecessor in interest 
exhibit / 28, Lawrence's predecessors would not have 
FD 263-2621 
/Wilber Mead 
had to acquire one. 
1. GTE provided the Funks with a key to the 
gate 
/ 2. Gate was locked 
FD 18:lO-19:14 1. Road (Blossom Mountain) was gated by 
2. To his knowledge, the only ones using the 
gate from 1966 until 1972 was GTE 
Affidavit of Wilber Mead 
3. Granted an easement to the Funks in 1972 
3. Key was needed for access 
1. Gate was locked from 1966 until 1998 
FD 29:20-29:24 1. Mr. Funk moved in 1975 
2. Mrs. Funk moved in svring of 1976 
[ten 
-
21 
- 
22 
- 
23 
- 
24 
- 
25 
- 
26 
- 
27 
- 
Location 
Funk 
Deposition 
Deposition / Ipurchased the land in 1969, until the time t f q  Funk ' 
I /sold it to Human Synergistics, they had been 
Description of evidence 
FD 30:2-30:17; 31:15-31:17 
Fact(& testify to: 
1. After 1975, Funks only visited the propem 
2-3 times 
FD 25:ll-25:23 
Deposition 
2. Never visited the property after 1981 
1. In the six years between the time the Funks 
Funk 
from Mead allowed him to go anywhere on 
Section 21 and Section 22 
FD 46:21-47:7 
to the mountain 20-30 times. 
Mr. Funk thought the easement he bought 
R. Vol2 p. 
304 ql2 
p. 307 9 
10-14 
R Vo12 p. 
266-271 
1. Nextel's use of Blossom Mountain was 
permissive 
2. Nextel use started in 1997 
July 24,2007 Affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence 
R Vo12 p. 
222 
1. Affiant driven down Mellick Road as early 
as 1996 
2. On June 12,2007, Lawrence took pictures 
of Mellick Rd. 
Photography taken on June 
12,2007 by Douglas 
Lawrence 
Access License Agreement 
between Nextel and 
defendants dated 11/7/97 
together with 
July 24,2007 affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence 
Illustrates current condition of Mellick Road 
R Vol2 p. 
!17 & 314 
July 24,2007 affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence together 
with exhibit letter 
Defendants receives notice that Nextel is 
assigning license agreement to Spectra Site 
- 
[ten 
-
28 
- 
29 
- 
30 
- 
3 1 
- 
32 
- 
Location 
R Val. 2 p 
218 & 314 
R Val 2 p. 
219 & 314 
R Vol 2 p. 
515 1 10 
R Vol 2 p. 
314 1 4 5  
R Vol 2 p. 
315148 
Description of evidence 
July 24,2007 affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence together 
with exhibit letter 
July 24,2007 affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence together 
with exhibit letter 
November 13,2007 affidavit 
of Douglas Lawrence 
July 24,2007 affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence 
iuly 24,2007 affidavit of 
Douglas Lawrence 
md defendants counter claim 
3gainst Nextel for breech of 
:ontract 
Fact@) testify to: 
Defendants receive notice that Spectra Site 
merges with American Tower 
April 2007, American Tower offers 
defendants lump sum payment for amending 
lease 
1. June 2007, holder of Nextel License 
agreement stops making payments. 
2. Monthly payments were made regularly 
and faithfully until June 2007, at which time 
they just stopped. 
Defendant never receives correspondence that 
rower Asset has an interest in the Nextel 
License 
1. At all times since the License Agreement, 
Nextel has had a key to the Lawrence gate. 
2. Defendants have never interfered with 
Nextel's use of the easement. 
3. Defendants opinion that Nextel or 
ruccessor filed complaint to get out of making 
3ayments. 
Item 
1 
630 
R Vol. 3 
p. 632 
R Vol. 3 p. 
636 
Location 
R Vo13 p. 
t 
hearings on motions to strike, this Court took 
judicial notice that Metsker maps have been 
relied upon for decades, but not as to their 
accuracv is not sufficient to contradict 
Howard Funk's testimonv. The only 
comuetition evidence of what existed in 1975 
is from Howard Funk. 
Capstar argues that the third element, present 
great necessity for the easement, is supuorted 
bv the affidavit of Thomas Mack. 
A review of Rebeor's affidavit shows he 
managed the tower site for Cavstar, and that 
on November 3, 1997, Nextel West Corp. 
entered into an "Access License Agreement" 
with Douglas and Brenda Lawrence in an 
effort to avoid litigation ... 
R Vol. 3 p. 
638 
Court's Wrong Fact&) 
The Metsker's map (at the August 7, 2007 
Howard Funk. 
There is no affidavit from 
Thomas Mack 
Rebeor's affidavit DOES 
NOT show that he managed 
the tower site for Capstar. 
R Vol. 3 p. 
636 
Comment 
There is no testimony from 
The uncontradicted evidence is that Funk's 
used the property consistently for the six vear 
period from the dav he sold to Human 
Svnergistics to the dav he moved from the 
On January 13,2003, Nextel assigned the 
Access License Agreement to Capstar. 
Funk moved away from the 
area the same year he sold to 
Human Synergistics (1975) 
There was never any 
assignment of the Nextel 
License Agreement to 
Caustar. 
Funk owned the Lawrence 
638 prescri~tive use Funks made of the parcel from the years 1969 tc 
1975 and could not have 
1969 to 1975. made a prescriptive use of hi 
own land. 
I I /easement to access it's equipment located on /clear that it is only seeking 
- 
R Vol. 3 p. 
639 
8 
The language in the recorded sales contract 
provided notice to others that Funk were 
claiming a rieht to use the road in the future 
for ingress and egress to the lands the Funks 
R Vol. 3 p. 
643 
Halls' property which Tower Asset leases 
from the Halls. 
The language is the sales 
agreement excepted from fee 
simple an easement 
previously granted to GTC 
injunctive relief in this case 
and that Tower Asset is no 
making any claim to title 
9 
retained. 
Lines 20-22 state: 
Tower Asset, as a tenant of Halls, seeks an 
10 
Lines 5-6 state: 
Tower Asset has made it 
-- 
R Vol. 3 p. 
11 
over Lawrence's Land. 
The Halls' parcel was broken out in 1996 Date incorrect 
643 
R Vol. 3 p. 
646 
Section 22 . . .. Affidavit of Daniel Rebeor 
(Tower Asset case files Julv 22.2003). 
R Vol. 3 p. 
647 
Tower Asset Sub. Inc. 
continues to lease the site 
from us." 
when the Funks sold a parcel to Rasmussen. 
Funk to Rasmussen (Deed August 26, 1996) Date incorrect 
Soectra Site was assigned a leasehold interest 
with Mark Hall and Robert Hall in a parcel of 
property situated in the Southwest Quarter of 
p. 651 L. 20-21 states: 
The uncontroverted evidence 
by Robert Hall is " ... that 
R Vol. 3 p. 
(647 
R Vol. 3 p. 
615 L. 3-7 
Additionally, Tower Asset asserts that there 
is nothing contained in the copy of the lease 
between Tower Asset and Hall that 
demonstrates a special agreement between 
Hall and Tower Asset that Tower Asset may 
not use an easement for which the Halls have 
the benefit. 
When the Lawrences questioned Tower 
Asset's right to access the property it leases 
from the Halls over the portion of Blossom 
Mountain Road that traversed Lawrences', 
Tower Asset filed suit on June 27,2003, 
seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive 
relief. 
/ 649 /that Tower Asset had already established that did not make a finding that I ' 
There is no lease in the 
record between Tower Asset 
and Hall. 
This simply is not a true 
statement. The Lawrences 
enter into an access license 
agreement with Nextel in 
November 1997. The 
Lawrences never heard of 
Tower Asset until they were 
R Vol. 3 p. 
1 1 easement. 1 an easement across the 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted on appeal 
the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were 
intended to have the right to use the 
served this complaint. 
The Idaho Supreme Court 
Tower Asset had already 
established that the Halls had 
/ 650 jremanded by the appellate court in this case / "Tower will have standing to R Vol. 3 p. Tower Asset correctly argues "the only issue 
was whether Tower Asset, as a tenant, has a 
legal right to benefit from the Blossom 
Mountain Road easement of its landlord, 
Halls" 
Lawrence parcel. 
The issue remanded is 
seek injunctive relief if it can 
establish it has an alleged 
legal right to benefit from the 
Blossom Mountain Road 
As lessee from the Halls, Tower Asset is 
entitled to injunctive relief against Lawrence: 
as to use of this easement across Lawrences' 
land for use of this road known as Signal 
Point Road. 
When Funks sold their portion of Section 21 
to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' 
predecessor) in 1975, Funk still owned their 
land in Section 22, and 'the sales agreement tc 
Humin Synergistics included "Item 5 in the 
sales agreement that " ... indicated that the 
Section 21 parcel was being sold subject to 
an ingresslegress easement over the existing 
road on the property that was being sold to 
Human Synergistics. Without those terms 
Funks' Section 21 prouertv would have been 
landlocked. 
Apparent continuous use from no later than 
1975 is also shown by the Affidavit of Wynn 
Wenker. 
Capstar also argues there is no evidence to 
support Lawrence's allegation that Funks 
moved to American Falls in 1975 
Signal Point Road does not 
:ross the Lawrence parcel. 
:unk did not retain property 
n Section 21 after the sale to 
luman Synergistic 
Nynn Wenker's affidavit 
estifies only to Verizon's use 
f the road. Verizon had an 
kasement across Blossom 
dountain Road. 
7unk testifies at deposition 
hat he and his wife move to 
iberdeenIAmerican Falls in 
975 
R Vo13 p. After Capstar filed its reply brief on 
629 summary judgment, on September 10,2007, 
Lawrences file yet another brief on summary 
judgment (in contravention of I.R.C.P. 
56(c)). 
R Vol. 3 p. Lawrences claim that "Capstar's use of the 
636 land has always been permissive" ignores the 
fact that Lawrences did not purchase their 
property until 1996. Thus, in the years from 
1966 to 1996, they are not competent to 
testify as to anything that occurred in that 
period. 
R Vol. 3 p. /The uncontroverted evidence is that Funks 
and their successors relied on language in the 
recorded sales contract as it is undisputed 
that Funks and their successors then 
proceeded to use the road openly, 
continuously, without interruptions, under a 
claim of right for much longer than the 
statutory period requires. 
The Summary Judgment 
hearing was scheduled for 
September 24 and the filing 
was timely. Furthermore, on 
September 17, Capstar 
stipulated to a continuance. 
The Funk, Rook, and 
Rebeor's affidavits, 
collaborate the fact that their 
use of the road was 
permissive. 
There has been no evidence 
submitted to support this 
finding. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
The Lawrence's are asking this court to decide if Summary Judgment was proper, based 
on the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other evidence in the record. The Lawrence's argue 
that the record overwhelmingly contains enough evidence to show that there exists real and 
genuine issues that contradict Tower's version of the facts and that the Lawrences were in 
opposition to a Summary Judgment finding. We further contend that the court did abuse its 
discretion by entering a Summary Judgment against the Lawrences. 
We ask this court to note that Tower did not provide a brief to this issue as this issue is 
indefensible and uncontroverted. 
DISOUALIFICATION 
The facts are, both Capstar and Tower sue the Lawrences over every easement theory 
conceivable and the trial court simply dismissed any evidence to the contrary and liberally 
favored every argument the Plaintiffs made. From a pragmatic and rational viewpoint, it is 
diff5cult to conceive how the trial court could find that Hall has an express easement, an 
easement by necessity, an easement implied by prior use, and a prescriptive easement. From a 
legal standpoint, its even harder to understand. Especially given the facts in this case. 
It is simply hard to understand how the trial court could simply ignore the existence of 
Mellick road and in particular a Metsker map from 1959, an affidavit from a licensed surveyor, a 
prior court finding, Harold Funk's deposition testimony, the Lawrence's affidavit, photography, 
satellite imagery, etc. In a summary judgment ruling, the facts are to be liberally construed in 
favor of the party opposing the motion and he is to be given the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence. And, it is quite clear that the 
trial court did not liberally construe the facts in favor of the Lawrences. 
Over the course of these past seven years, the Lawrences became increasingly convinced 
that they could not and would not receive a fair and impartial trial from the trial court. There 
comes a point when you realize that a person has simply closed their eyes to the facts, has quit 
listening to reason, and there is absolutely nothing you can say or do that is going to overcome or 
change a preconceived bias or prejudice. With the trail court, the Lawrences reached that point 
some years ago and were totally unable to do a single thing about it. 
A judge's impartiality in a matter can be determined. It can be determined simply by 
asking the question, "Is the court willing to recluse itself?" Lf the answer is yes, then the answer 
is obvious. The court is impartial. If the answer is no, then the answer is obvious as well. 
A truly impartial court, would be absolutely impartial as to to whether or not it was the 
finder and trier of fact. It has no personal interest in the matter at all. It has no motive, no 
rational, and no reason to be involved. A fmly impartial court would conclude that the 
appearance of justice is such an essential component to the courts position in the proceeding, that 
without it, the administration of justice has not been served. On the other hand, a court that does 
not recluse itself, can no longer claim that is it truly impartial. For the giving of any reason 
shows that the court has a reason, a rational, or a motive to stay in the matter. It is irrespective 
what that reason is. The court has a personal interest or a personal stake in the matter that the 
court is intent on seeing through. 
The appearance of justice is not an element that is separate and distinguishable from the 
administration of justice. If the "product" of the court is the administration of justice. It is the 
appearance of justice that allows the losing party to accept the court's decision. And, it is the 
appearance of justice that gives the courts the respect by which to work within society and 
communities. 
In its memorandum of decisio~, the only rational the court gives for not disqualifying 
itself, is an argument that the court harbors no bias towards the Lawrences or their attorney. It 
certainly offered nothing that would convince the Lawrences of the court's impartiality and it 
certainly did nothing to further the administration of justice in this matter. 
There are two other issues closely related to the Lawrence's concerns over how the court's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. One issues deals with an independent investigation 
the court conducted and the other deals with how the court handled the admission of affidavit 
testimony. 
Tower provided no response in its brief relating to the issue of the court's independent 
investigation. The trial court conducted an independent investigation into the Lawrence's motion 
for disqualification by looking at files and records not related to the present matter and not 
offered in as evidence. The court abused its discretion. And, Tower has not offered any rebuttal 
or defense of this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Tower Asset is the party that pursued the summary judgment ruling. They pursued this 
action with the absolute confidence that the trial court would rule in their favor; just as the 
Lawrences knew with absolute confidence the trial court would rule against them. That is why 
the Lawrences pursued a motion for disqualification and why John P. Whelan filed a formal 
complaint with the Idaho Judicial Council. There was little doubt how the trial court was going 
.. 
to rule on any motion Tower placed before the trial court. 
This Court ruled (earlier) that Tower does not have standing to pursue a quiet title action. 
And, that Tower would having standing to seek injunctive relief if Tower can demonstrate it has 
a legal right to benefit from the easement. Rather, than pursue the course of action this case was 
remanded back to the lower court for, Tower chose to delay, obstruct, and hinder the 
administration of justice, by presenting a gross misinterpretation of this Court's earlier ruling. , 
The Lawrences ask this court to enjoin Tower's use of the Lawrence property and for a monetary 
award for all lost revenue and all fees and damages the Lawrences have had to incur defending 
this action. 
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